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Feller: Putting Gilmer Where it Belongs: The FAA's Labor Exemption

PUTTING GILMER WHERE IT BELONGS:
THE FAA'S LABOR EXEMPTION
David E. Feller*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1991 decision of the Supreme Court in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson-LaneCorp.' it has become common for employers to
require, as a condition of employment, that their employees agree to
arbitrate rather than sue on claims of violation of federal and state antidiscrimination statutes. The number of employees who so agree is
impossible to know. Estimates are that approximately 8 to 10% of the
United States workforce is covered by such agreements.2 The vast
majority of these agreements, estimated to be 85%, have been instituted

since the Gilmer decision. Enforcement of such provisions has been
regarded by almost all students of industrial relations as undesirable and
unfair.4 Legislation to prevent it is supported by labor civil rights
* John H. Boalt Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California School of Law at
Berkeley, A.B. Harvard College, 1938, LL.B 1941 Harvard Law School. The editors of the Hofstra
Labor & Employment Law Journal have updated and augmented the footnotes. Professor Feller has
filed a brief amicus curiae for the National Academy of Arbitrators in the Supreme Court in support
of the respondent in the Circuit City Stores case described in the text. The views expressed in the
article, however, do not represent the views of the Academy.
1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2. See Katherine V. W. Stone, Employment Arbitrationunder the FederalArbitrationAct, in
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS INTHE CHANGING WORKPLACE 27, 27
(Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds. 1999) [hereinafter Stone, Employment Arbitration]
(reporting various surveys). The GAO reported in 1995 that 9.9 percent of employers provided for
arbitration and that roughly half of them required it as a condition of employment. See United States
General Accounting Office, Employment Discrimination:Most Private-Sector Employers Use
Alternative Dispute Resolution 7 (GAO/HEHS-95-150, July 5, 1995). In 1997 it raised the percent
of employers providing for arbitration to 19. See United States General Accounting Office,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Employers' Experiences With ADR in the Workplace 2
(GAO/GGD-97-157, Aug. 12, 1997).
3. See Stone, Employment Arbitration,supra note 2, at 27, 57 n.6.
4. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, MandatoryArbitrationof IndividualEmployment
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organizations. 5 The EEOC,6 the Dunlop Commission7 and the National

Academy of Arbitrators8 have opposed it. At least some of the lower
courts have struggled to avoid or limit such enforcement. The Ninth

Circuit has concluded that Gilmer does not apply to claims of violation
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as amended in 1991. 9 Other courts, like the
D.C. and the Tenth Circuits, have held that such provisions are
unenforceable if the complainant must share in the payment of the
arbitrator's fees.' ° And still other courts have found that such provisions
are contracts of adhesion which should not be enforced if any element of
unfairness can be found or the plaintiff was not given adequate notice of
the terms of the arbitration agreement." Where the defense against suit is
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contractof the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1017, 1019-20 (1996); David
S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Printto ProtectBig Business: Employee and ConsumerRights Claims
in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 38 (1997); Joseph R. Grodin,
Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationClaims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14
HOESTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Arnold M. Zack, Agreements to Arbitrate and the Waiver of Rights
under Employment Law, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS 67, 67
(Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds. 1999). But see Samuel Estreicher, Predispute
Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1344 (1997).
5. Senator Feingold, a Democrat from Wisconsin, sponsored S.121 which would amend the
FAA to specifically exempt from the FAA claims of unlawful discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, age or disability. See Susan J. McGolrick, Senate Subcommittee Hears Testimony on
Arbitration of Employment Bias Disputes, 42 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-10 (Mar. 2, 2000). At
hearings before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts it was
supported by 13 civil rights, labor, women's rights and employee rights organizations. See id.
6. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Policy Statement on Mandatory
Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, Notice
915.002, § 603 (EEOC Compliance Manual 1997). For a full discussion of the EEOC position see
Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1999).
7. See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 26-27 (Dec. 1994).
8. See Arbitration 1997: The Next Fifty Years, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFiETH ANNUAL
MEETING, NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 312 (1998).
9. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 982 (1998). Contra Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1139 (1999).
10. See Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999);
Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Randolph v. Green
Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d. 1149, 1158 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. Apr. 3,
2000) (No. 99-1235).
11. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-40 (4th Cir. 1999);
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 21 (Ist Cir. 1999); Paladino
v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998); Gibson v. Neighborhood
Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1129, 1131 (7th Cir. 1997); Diaz v. Arapahoe (Burt) Ford, Inc.,
80 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1856, 1856 (D. Col. 1999); Gonzalez v. Hughes Aircraft
Employees Fed. Credit Union, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 765-66 (Ct. App. 1999); Ramirez v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 5 Wages-Hours Cas.2d (BNA) 1360, 1362-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). Other cases
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based on the arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
the Supreme Court itself has reversed the usual presumption of
arbitrability.' 2 And in the very industry in which the Gilmer case arose,
the requirement that every employee enter into an arbitration agreement
as a condition of working as a broker has been abandoned. 3
These are all symptoms of dissatisfaction with the wide application
of the principle announced in Gilmer. But, rather than nibbling at the
fringes, a remedy is readily at hand, a remedy consistent with the Gilmer
decision, but which will confine the application of that case to the kind
of individual employee that the Court apparently had in mind when it
decided the case. That remedy is the exemption contained in section 1 of
the Federal Arbitration Act when properly construed. 4
The enforceability of agreements requiring arbitration of, and
waiving the right to sue on, claims of violation of federal and state antidiscrimination statutes rests on the Federal Arbitration Act. That Act, in
section 2, makes irrevocable and enforceable "[a] written provision
in... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce....",
But it also contains an exemption in section 1: "nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce."' 6 Despite the exemption, the Court in Gilmer held that the
FAA required a broker who had agreed to arbitrate disputes with his
employer to arbitrate his claim of violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. 7 The Court said that it would not decide but "leave for
another day" the question of whether the exemption applied because the
issue had not been raised in the court below and the promise to arbitrate
was not contained in a contract of employment but in the plaintiff's
registration statement with the New York Stock Exchange.
Since Gilmer, the exemption has had little effect on the broad
application of the FAA in employment disputes because the lower courts

are reviewed in Michael Delikat & Rene' Kathawala, Arbitrationof Employment Discrimination
Claims Under Pre-DisputeAgreements: IVill Gilmer Survive?, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 83,

92-107 (1998).
12. See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,79 (1998).
13. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims, 63 Fed. Reg. 35,299, 35,303 (June 22, 1998).
14. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).

15. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
17. See Gilmer,500 U.S. at 23-24,35.
18. Seeid. at25n.2.
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have almost unanimously construed the exemption to apply only if the
employees' work involved or directly related to the actual movement of
goods in interstate transportation. 9 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has now challenged that interpretation of the exemption's
commerce requirement in three cases, at least one of which will be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.20 If the Ninth Circuit's view is sustained
by the Court, as I will argue it should be, the way will be open to use the
exemption to confine Gilmer to where it belongs and, at the same time,
to end the remaining difference between section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 and the Federal Arbitration Act in
the treatment of arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.
II. THE THREE CASES
The three Ninth Circuit cases challenging the exemption's former
interpretation are Craft v. Campbell Soup Co. ,21 Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams,22 and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed.2 The lead case was
Craft,but no petition for certiorari was filed in it. The two Circuit City
cases were per curium reversals relying on Craft and petitions for
certiorari were filed in both.24 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the Adams case on May 22, 2000 and it was argued on November 6,
2000. The critical focus of the article will nevertheless be on Craft in
which the Ninth Circuit set forth its reasoning.
Craft was a suit brought in federal district court claiming, among
other things, racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. An employee of Campbell Soup, an industry
affecting commerce, who was not involved in transportation brought the

19. See McWilliams, II. v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1998); O'Neil v.
Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354,
357-58 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole, 105 F.3d at 1470-72; Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745,
748 (5th Cir. 1996); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1995);
Erving v. Va. Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. duPont,
443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers,
Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953).
20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
22. 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curium), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2004 (U.S. May,

2000) (No. 99-1379).
23. 195 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curium), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3536
(U.S. Feb. 16,2000) (No. 99-1378).
24. See id.; Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 120 S. Ct. 2004 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-

1379).
25. See Craft, 177 F.3d at 1084.
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case. 6 The plaintiff was covered by a collective bargaining agreement
containing a non-discrimination clause and an arbitration provision.27
Campbell Soup moved for summary judgment on the ground that under
the collective bargaining agreement the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was
arbitration." The motion was denied.29 Campbell Soup appealed.'O
The Ninth Circuit never reached the merits. It directed the parties to
address the question of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal."
The denial of a motion is not a final decision permitting an appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.32 The FAA, however, provides an exception. Section
16(a)(1)(A), added to the FAA in 1988, provides that "[a]n appeal may
be taken from... an order... refusing a stay of any action under section
3 of this title.... , Treating the denial of the motion as the equivalent
of an order refusing a stay under section 3 of the FAA, Campbell Soup
argued that section 16 gave the court appellate jurisdiction. 4 The Ninth
Circuit, in an extended two to one per curium opinion, held that the FAA
was inapplicable and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.35 It
held, contrary to the other circuits, that the section 1 exemption covered
contracts of employment of employees engaged in an industry affecting
commerce even though they were not themselves engaged in interstate
transportation. 6
If the Ninth Circuit had reached the merits its decision would have
been based on section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947,"7 and the Federal Arbitration Act would have been irrelevant. The
Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala.,38 held
that the enforceability of arbitration provisions in a collective bargaining
26. See id. at 1084-85.
at 1084.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. It appears likely that the district court denied the motion on the ground that the
bargaining agreement should not be read as making the statutory claim arbitral. See Craft, 177 F.3d
at 1084. The District Court's decision is unreported, but on appeal the Ninth Circuit cited its own
decision in Doyle v. Raley's, Inc., 158 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 1998), describing the district court's
decision. See Craft, 177 F.3d at 1084 n.3. The Doyle Court had held that a suit claiming
discrimination in violation of several statutes was not barred by the anti-discrimination and
arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. See Doyle, 158 F.3d at 1013, 1015-16.
30. See Craft, 177 F.3d at 1084.
31. See id. at 1083.
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (1994).
34. See Craft, 177 F.3d at 1085 & n.5.
35. See id. at 1083, 1094.
36. See id. at 1092.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).

38. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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agreement was to be governed by section 301."9 Then in the Steelworkers
Trilogy the Supreme Court held that section 301 embodied a proarbitration policy and that all doubts had to be resolved in favor of
arbitration. 4' After argument in the Craft case, however, the Supreme
Court decided Wright v. UniversalMaritime Service Corp.42 Wright held
that where arbitrability under a collective bargaining agreement is posed
as a bar to an anti-discrimination suit the presumption is reversed: the
waiver of the right to sue must be clear and unmistakable.43 Perhaps
because Wright would have required an affirmance on the merits,

Campbell Soup did not seek review of the Ninth Circuit decision that
there was no appellate jurisdiction.
The Circuit City Stores cases arose in a quite different context and
directly involved the FAA. Both cases arose from suits against Circuit

City Stores, Inc., a Virginia Corporation, filed by California residents in
California trial courts claiming violations of California's antidiscrimination statute.45 The plaintiffs were salespersons, in different
stores, who had agreed as a condition of employment to arbitrate
disputes with their employer. 46 Circuit City believed that the plaintiffs
were obligated by the FAA to arbitrate their statutory claims.47 It did not,
however, remove the state court actions to federal court. It could not
because the plaintiffs had joined, as defendants, individuals who were
California residents and there was therefore not the required complete
TM Section
diversity.
4 of the FAA, however, authorizes any federal
district court having jurisdiction to issue an order directing arbitration on
the petition of anyone aggrieved by the failure of a party to an agreement
to arbitrate. In both cases, Circuit City Stores filed petitions in federal

39. Seeid. at450-51.
40. See United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
41. See Warrior,363 U.S. at 582-83.
42. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
43. See id. at 79-82.
44. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 2004 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1379); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed,
195 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), petitionfor cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3536 (U.S. Feb. 16,
2000) (No. 99-1378).
45. See Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071; Ahmed, 195 F.3d at 1132.
46. See Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071; Ahmed, 195 F.3d at 1132.
47. See Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071; Ahmed, 195 F.3d at 1132.
48. See Adams, 194F.3d at 1071, 1072;Ahmed, 195 F.3d at 1132, 1133.
49. See Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)).
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district courts under section 4, relying on diversity for jurisdiction."
They requested an order directing arbitration of the plaintiffs' claims and
staying the state court actions. The orders were granted and the plaintiffs
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.51 The Ninth Circuit reversed in per curium
decisions, citing Craft for the inapplicability of the FAA because of the
exemption. 2 Circuit City Stores filed petitions for certiorari in both
cases.53 The Supreme Court granted the petition in the Adams case- The
petition in the Ahmed case remains pending.
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S CRAFTRATIONALE
The difference between the Ninth Circuit and the other circuits as to
the meaning of the section 1 exemption revolves around the meaning of
the commerce requirement, defined as interstate or foreign commerce. It
is not unreasonable, apart from the context, to read the words "engaged
in commerce" to mean just that - participating or taking part in interstate
or foreign transportation or closely connected to it. That is how all the
other circuits have read it. The problem, the Ninth Circuit argued, is the
context. 5 The FAA itself only applies to contracts "evidencing a
transaction involving commerce." 56 "Involving commerce" could mean
the same thing as "engaged in commerce," that is actually involving or
connected to interstate or foreign transportation. In 1925, when it passed
the Act, Congress indeed must have understood that "involving
commerce" had that same narrow reading because, at that time, the
Supreme Court had held that was the extent of Congress's power under
the commerce clause of the Constitution. 7 The coverage of the
exemption in 1925 was therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded,
coextensive with the Act's.58
Since 1925, however, the Supreme Court changed its view of the
50. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. C98-0365, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6215, at *6

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 1998).
51. See Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071; Ahmed, 195 F.3d at 1132.
52. See Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071-72; Ahmed, 195 F.3d at 1133.
53. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 1205 S. Ct. 2004 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 991379); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 195 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), petitionfor
cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W 3536 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2000) (No. 99-1378).
54. See Adams, 120S. Ct. at 2004.
55. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 117 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999).

56. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
57. United Leather Workers Int'l Union, Local 66 v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S.
457, 471-72 (1924); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 269-73 (1918), overruled by United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Howard v. 11. Cent. R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 463,492-93 (1908).
58. See Craft, 177 F.3d at 1085.
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commerce power. As presently construed, the Constitution permits
Congress to regulate industries affecting, but not actually in,
commerce.59 The Court in 1995 decided that in using the words
"involving commerce," Congress meant to encompass all the activity it
had the power to regulate.6° To carry out that presumed intention,
"involving commerce" should be construed to mean "affecting"
commerce, not just being engaged in it.6' So a contract to inspect a house
for termites, the Supreme Court held, came within the FAA because the
contractor used materials that came from out of state. 62
Once we understand that Congress in 1925 must have meant the
exemption to cover exactly the same area as the statute itself, the Ninth
Circuit concluded, it follows that the expansive reading now given to the
statute must also be extended to the exemption. 6 To do otherwise would
be to run exactly contrary to the intention of Congress insofar as we can
know it. The exemption, therefore, applied to the plaintiff s contract and
the FAA's grant of jurisdiction over the appeal did not apply. 64
The exemption issue had been addressed in precisely the same
jurisdictional context once before. In Prynerv. Tractor Supply Co.,"5 the
Seventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal of an order
refusing to stay an action on the ground that the claim was arbitrable
under a collective bargaining agreement." It held that section 16 of the
FAA, as well as section 301, applied and the exemption in section 1 was
inapplicable because the plaintiffs were not engaged in interstate
transportation. 67 It then went on to hold, in disagreement with the Fourth
Circuit,6 that the union did not have the power under section 301 to
waive the individuals' right to sue. 69
IV. THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE EXEMPTION
The Ninth Circuit's Craft logic is irrefutable in the absence of any

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
1996).
69.

See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-75 (1995).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 282.
See Craft, 177 F.3d at 1093.
See id. at 1094.
109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 359-60.
See id. at 360.
See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885-86 (4th Cir.
See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 363.
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contrary indication of Congressional intention, and there is none. The
conventional reading of the exemption, as covering only contracts of
those engaged in transportation, appears nonsensical as a matter of
common sense. Why would a Congress aware of the then understood
limit on its powers under the commerce clause choose to exempt the
activity that it most clearly had the power to regulate from a statute
which the Supreme Court has now told us was intended to exercise its
power to the Constitutional limit?
In an attempt to rationalize such a result the courts that have
endorsed this view have offered various rationales. They range from the
assumption that seamen's right to arbitration was already protected, 0 to
the claim that Congress was aware that enforcement of arbitration was
already provided for railroad employees in the Railway Labor Act.7 As
Professor Matthew Finkin has devastatingly demonstrated, all of them
are illusory." The seamen's statute73 did not provide for judicial
enforcement of arbitration and the Railroad Labor Act's arbitration
provisions did not exist when the FAA was passed.7 4
Lacking any rationale for the restricted view of the exemption,
some courts have relied on the difference between the words "engaged
in commerce" in the section 1 exemption and "involving commerce" in
the coverage language in section 2. The difference is, however, easily
explained: "Engaged" is used in describing persons while "involving" is
used in describing transactions. One could not say that a person was
"involving" commerce or that a transaction was "engaged" in commerce.

70. See Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 437, 207 F.2d
450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953).
71. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354,358 (7th Cir. 1997).
72. See Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under The United States Arbitration Act:
An Essay in Historical Claification, 17 BERELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 291-92 (1996)
[hereinafter Finkin, Workers' Contracts]; Matthew W. Finkin, Employment Contracts Under the
FAA-Reconsidered, 48 LAB. LJ. 329, 331 (1997) [hereinafter Finkin, Employment Contracts].
73. Law of June 7, 1872, ch. 5, § 4554, 53 R.S. 887, 887 (1872) (provision in effect when the
FAA was passed); See 46 U.S.C. § 651 (1982) (repealed 1983). It gave shipping commissioners the
power to hear and decide disputes between masters, agents or owners and members of a crew that
both parties had agreed in writing to submit to him to decide those disputes. See § 4554, 53 R.S. at
887; Act of June 7, 1872, ch. 322, § 25, 17 Stat. 262, 267 (1872). It did not make the agreements
enforceable. Indeed, it was precisely because the FAA would make them enforceable that gave rise
to the opposition to the Act that the exemption was drafted to meet. See infra pp. 263-64.
74. The earlier decision of the Third Circuit in Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio &
Mach. Workers, Local 437, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953), did not make this chronological error. It
cited Title III of the Transportation Act, 1920, 41 Stat 496. See Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452 n.8. That
Act, a predecessor of the Railway Labor Act, did provide a procedure for the resolution of
grievances, but arbitration under that Act was not legally enforceable. See Pa. R.R. Co. v. United
States R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72, 84 (1923).
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It would be entirely logical to assume that the two terms were meant to
be co-extensive and the difference was simply syntactical.
Some courts have invoked the principle of ejusdem generis.
Ejusdem generis is an interpretative tool that assumes that the drafter of
a document intended that general terms which follow specific ones
should be limited to those similar to the specified terms.75 Thus, in those
courts' view, the general phrase "other workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce" should be limited to those who are similar to the
specified seamen and railroad employees who are actually engaged in
the movement of goods in commerce.7 6 The ejusdem generis principle
must, however, be applied in context. Let us posit, as we must given the
Supreme Court's decision, that (1) Congress intended by using
"involving commerce" to exercise the full extent of its powers under the
commerce clause as it understood them in 1925 and assume further (2)
that in 1925 it had the same understanding as to its power with respect to
the exemption, and assume finally (3) that it explicitly wrote the ejusdem
generis principle into the exception. On those assumptions the
exemption would read as follows: "Nothing contained herein shall apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other
class of workers whose contracts are now similarly subject to regulation
under the commerce clause of the Constitution." The similarity which
the Congress in 1925 assumed still exists and the modem view of the
extent of Congressional power should be applied to the exemption.
Putting aside the post hoc rationales and the language quibbles and
lacking any Congressional statement of an intention to differentiate
between the Act's coverage and the exemption, the only tool available to
discern the probable intention of the exemption is the history of how it
came to be. Thanks to the work of Professor Finkin we do know that.
Briefly summarized, the facts as reported by Finkin are that the Act
was the product of and was drafted by the American Bar Association
("ABA").77 The initial draft provoked the vigorous opposition of Andrew
Furuseth, the head of the International Seamen's Union, who enlisted the
opposition of the American Federation of Labor.78 To meet this
opposition, which it did not fully understand, 79 the ABA agreed to and
75. See BLACK'S LAwDIcriONARY 608 (4th ed. 1951).
76. See Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592,598 (6th Cir. 1995).
77. See Fimkin, Workers' Contracts,supranote 72, at 283.
78. See Finkin, Workers' Contracts, supra note 72, at 284; Finkin, Employment Contracts,
supra note 72, at 329-30.
79. When the American Arbitration Association's first version, without the exemption, was
before the Senate Judiciary Committee the ABA representative adverted to Furuseth's objection and
said that the only criticism was that the bill would compel arbitration between "the stevedores and
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the Congress adopted, the language of the exemption in the precise
words suggested by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover to meet the
union opposition.Yo There are no significant references to the exemption
in the committee reports on the bill or in the debates on the floor.
To get some insight into what Congress meant to accomplish,
therefore, we must look to the basis of the opposition which engendered
the Congressional action designed to meet that opposition. The
fundamental basis for Furuseth's opposition was the effect he believed
the FAA would have on his constituents, seamen.8' Furuseth had been
instrumental in obtaining the passage of the Seamen's Act of 1915.8
That Act gave seamen certain rights he believed would be taken away by
a statute making agreements to arbitrate enforceable."' Uniquely among
American workers, seamen were and still are required by statute to sign
individual contracts of employment called "shipping articles."" These
"articles" are individual written contracts of employment committing the
seamen to serve on a specified voyage and the employer to provide
certain basic benefits.n According to Furuseth, there had arisen a
practice of including in "articles" something not required by statute: an
agreement to arbitrate disputes before a shipping commissioner or, if in a
foreign port, before a United States consul. a Such an arbitration, in
Furuseth's view, would constitute "compulsory labor" because an
arbitrator might require a seaman to remain on or return to a ship even
though under the Seamen's Act he would have the right to leave,
forfeiting only payY He therefore opposed enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate. a
That history certainly explains the exemption of contracts of
employment of seamen. But what about the railroad workers and other
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce? Professor Finkin
argues that Furuseth believed that the consequences to seamen that he
feared as a result of making arbitration agreements enforceable would
their employers." Finkin, Workers' Contracts, supra note 72, at 285. Furuseth, who represented
seamen, spent much of his life battling stevedores. See HYMAN WEINTRAUB, ANDREW FURUSETH:
EMANcIPATOR OF THE SEAMEN 78-84 (1959).

80. See Finkin, Employment Contracts,supranote 72, at 330.
81. See id.
82. Act of Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1164 (1915). For a description of Furuseth's role in
the enactment of the statute see WEINTRAUB, supranote 79, at 113-32.
83. See Finkin, Employment Contracts,supranote 72, at 330.
84. 46 U.S.C. § 10302 (1994); see Finkin, Workers' Contracts,supranote 72, at 286.
85. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 10302(a)-10302(b)(8).
86. See Finkin, Workers' Contracts,supranote 72, at 287, 292.

87. See id. at 287.
88. See id. at 287-88.
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also apply to other workers covered by collective bargaining
agreements." Furuseth's view was that collective agreements were, in
legal effect, incorporated into individual contracts of employment of the
workers covered by the collective agreements." Whether Furuseth's
legal theory can then be attributed to the American Bar Association and
to Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover and, through them, to the
Congress, seems to me to be a considerable stretch. More likely is the
explanation that drafters and sponsors of the legislation had in mind only
commercial contracts, not anything whatsoever to do with the
employment relationship, as the ABA representative told the Senate
Judiciary Committee when he responded to Furuseth's opposition and
suggested an exemption.9'
Whatever the true explanation of the origin of the exemption, there
is certainly nothing in that history which refutes the Ninth Circuit's
simple and direct explanation that given the then extant view of the
scope of Congress's authority, it must have intended the exemption to be
as broad as the Act's coverage. The real question is whether the courts
which have expanded the coverage of the Act beyond that which
Congress contemplated in 1925 should refuse to do so also with respect
to the exemption. Reading the commerce requirement in section 2 of the
statute differently from the commerce requirement in section 1 of the
same statute would seem to warrant Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting
comment in FarmersReservoir & IrrigationCo. v. McComb,:9 "If the
Court could say 'To be or not to be: that is the question,' it might
reasonably answer in support of either side. But here the Court tells us
that the real solution of this dilemma is 'to be' and 'not to be' at the
same time."' There is no reason to engage in such an anamorphic
exercise unless there is some sound policy reason to do so.
One such policy reason might be the breadth that could be given to
the exemption by reading the commerce requirement in it broadly. That,
indeed, was suggested by the Seventh Circuit in Pryner v. Tractor

89. See id. at 289.
90. See id.
91. See Finkin, Workers' Contracts, supra note 72, at 285. ABA representative W.H.H.
Piatt's testimony was:
It is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an
act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with
each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it.
Id. at 285.
92. 337 U.S. 755 (1949).
93. Farmers,337 U.S. at 772.
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Co.9 There, the Seventh Circuit declared that reading
"commerce" identically in both the coverage and exemption provisions
would "give the exclusion a breathtaking scope. It would mean that an
arbitration clause in an employment contract between a giant
multinational corporation and its chief executive officer would, though
plausibly 'involving' interstate commerce within the meaning of section
2, not be enforceable in federal court." 95
Not so. The exemption must be read as a whole. Merely meeting
the commerce requirement does not automatically make it applicable.
All of the decisions and the commentary as to the scope of the
exemption have focused solely on the commerce requirement and have
assumed that if it was met, all contracts of employment would be
exempt. 6 But there are other requirements. Once we pass the specific
industries mentioned in the exemption, the only employees whose
contracts are exempted from the act are "workers." That term is not
defined, but in common parlance it does not include a "chief executive
officer," or indeed any management employee. Thus, the United Steel
Workers, the United Automobile Workers, and the United Mine Workers
are organizations of working men and women, not management. When
the ABA's representative suggested the exemption because the Act was
not intended to refer to "labor disputes," he was not referring to disputes
between management and owners.Y The dictionaries confirm that the
term "workers" excludes management. Webster's says that "worker" is
synonymous with laborer or toiler, "one who is employed esp[ecially] at
manual or industrial labor for a wage" or "a member of the working
class."9' The American Heritage Dictionary defines "worker" as "[o]ne
who does manual or industrial labor" as "[a] member of the working
class."'
The only appellate decision on the question agrees. In Bernhardtv.
Polygraphic Co. of Am.,' 00 the Second Circuit held that the exemption
Supply

94. 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997).
95. Id. at 358.
96. Including Professor Finkin, who asserts broadly that the Act "exempts contracts of
employment, all contracts of employment, over which Congress had constitutional authority."
Finkin, Workers' Contracts,supranote 72, at 298.
97. See supranote 91.
98. WEBSTER'S THIRD Naw INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 2634 (1982).
99. THE AMRICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICnONARY 1554 (3d ed. 1993).
100. 218 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). The Court of

Appeals had held that section 3 of the Act, providing for a stay of a suit for breach of contract if the
contract provided for arbitration, was applicable even in the absence of an allegation that the
contract evidenced a transaction involving interstate commerce. See id. at 951. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that sections 1,2 and 3 are integral parts of the statute and that section 3 was
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was inapplicable in a suit for breach of an employment contract by a
superintendent of a plant because the superintendent was not a
"worker.''. Lacking a statutory definition that would draw the line
between management and "workers" the line can be drawn on a case by
case basis. Alternatively, and preferably, courts can turn to the decisions
which had to draw that line in establishing the rights of workers to be
free of anti-union discrimination and to bargain collectively under the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935.' 2 There is a substantial body of
law construing that Act that can be utilized to precisely define the limits
of the exemption. So construing the exemption would confine it
precisely to the kind of employees that were encompassed in Furuseth's
and the ABA's concerns. Executives would be covered. And so would
almost all unionized workers, as I shall argue below.
To come within the section 1 exemption, an agreement to arbitrate
must also be contained in a "contract[] of employment."' 3 That includes
individual agreements to arbitrate future disputes that workers are
required to execute as a condition of employment. It does not, however,
include an ad hoc agreement not required as a condition of employment
to arbitrate specific disputes between a worker and an employer, and it
does not include collective bargaining agreements.
In Craft the Ninth Circuit assumed, without really addressing the
question, that the collective agreement providing for arbitration was a
"contract of employment" and that, therefore, the FAA did not cover
Campbell Soup's motion to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs Title VII
claim.'O' While I believe, for the reasons already stated, that it was
correct in concluding that the interstate commerce limitation in the
exemption was satisfied because the plaintiff's employment affected
commerce, it was wrong in assuming that a collective bargaining
agreement requiring arbitration should be treated as a "contract of
employment." The Supreme Court had made the same assumption in a
footnote in United PaperworkersInt'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc.,0 5

inapplicable to a contract not covered by section 2 because not involving a transaction involving
commerce. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201-02 (1956). The Court did
not reach the "worker" question.
101. See Bernhardt,218 F.2d at 951-52.
102. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,294 (1974). Ideally the exemption should
include employees held to be protected by the NLRA under PackardMotor CarCo. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485 (1947), prior to the 1947 exclusion of supervisors since foreman are not normally able to
negotiate the terms of their employment. See infra text at p. 275.

103. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
104. Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (1999).
105. 484 U.S. 29,40 n.9 (1987).
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but without explanation.' The assumption is wrong.
It is plain, of course, that the collective agreement is not in itself a
contract17of employment. As the Supreme Court put it in J.L Case Co. v.
NLRB,
Collective bargaining between employer and the representatives of a
unit, usually a union, results in an accord as to terms which will govern
hiring and work and pay in that unit. The result is not, however, a
contract of employment except in rare cases; no one has a job by
reason of it and no obligation to any individual ordinarily comes into
existence from it alone. 08
That should settle the question, but not quite. Another question is
whether, when an employee is hired, the law, and in particular the FAA,
should treat the terms of the collective agreement as being incorporated
in individual contracts of employment between the employee and the
employer so as to make the exemption applicable. Andrew Furuseth so
believed and the Supreme Court in J.L Case seemed to so suggest. The
suggestion is wrong.
Except in rare cases, because no written individual contracts of
employment exist under a collective agreement, the question of whether
the law should deem there to be an oral agreement embodying the terms
of the collective agreement depends on whether the consequences of so
doing corresponds to what the parties to that collective agreement
normally expect."° One consequence of imputing the existence of an
individual contract of employment from a collective agreement is that
each party to that imputed contract is legally responsible to the other for
any breach. But this is plainly not so as between an employer and an
employee under a typical industrial collective bargaining agreement.
Such an agreement sets out standards for the conduct of the employer
(the payment of wages, scheduling, providing rest periods, etc.) and for
the employee (reporting times, work standards, absenteeism, abstention
from strikes, etc.). 1 ° But the expected consequence of a failure to
comply by either the employer or employee with the standards set forth
in the collective agreement is not a suit for damages or for specific
performance.
106. See id.
107. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
108. J.L Case, 321 U.S. at 334-35.
109. See David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CAL.
L. R v. 663, 748 (1973) [hereinafter Feller, General Theory].
110. Seeid.at739-40.
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Take the rules governing employee conduct. If the agreement
provides that the employee shall report for work at his assigned station
by a specified hour and the employee fails to do so, the expected
consequence is not a suit for breach of contract even if arbitration is not
provided for. If the agreement provides that the employee shall not
smoke in designated areas because of the hazard of explosion and an
employee does smoke and an explosion occurs, it is not anticipated that
the employee shall be responsible for the consequential damages. The
consequence which the parties envisage for failure of an employee to
comply with the standards set forth in the collective agreement, or rules
which the agreement authorizes the employer to establish, is not a law
suit, but discipline."' That discipline may be discharge, often referred to
as industrial capital punishment, or it may be some lesser punishment
such as a warning or a suspension, depending upon the nature of the
offense and the employee's length of service, his past record and other
factors similar to those considered
in determining punishments for
2
offenses against the criminal law."
That the parties do not normally intend the collective agreement to
be embodied in individual contracts of employment is shown equally
with respect to employer violations of the standards set forth in the
collective agreement. The typical collective agreement provides: that
when an employee claims that the employer has not complied with the
standards set forth in the agreement, the appropriate action is not the
filing of a lawsuit, but the filing of a grievance."' The grievance, if not
resolved in negotiation, is ultimately resolved in arbitration, a
proceeding not between the employer and the employee, but between the
parties to the collective agreement - the union and the employer."4 And
the remedies which the parties authorize the arbitrator to provide either
explicitly, or as a matter of custom and practice, are not the same as the
remedies which would follow if the employer's violation of the terms of
the agreement were deemed to be a violation of an individual contract
with the employee."'
The simplest case to illustrate this is the discharge grievance.
Collective agreements usually provide that an employee shall not be

111. See id. at 740,742-43.
112. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and Industrial Discipline as Sanctioning
Systems: Some ComparativeObservations,in LABOR ARBITRATION: PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS
125, 132-36, 138-39, 141-42 (Mark L. Kahn ed., 1964).
113. See Feller, General Theory, supranote 109, at 738.
114. See id. at 745.
115. Seeid. at749-50.
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discharged except for just cause. 16 If an employee is discharged and
believes that there was not just cause for the discharge, he can file a
grievance." 7 If the grievance is not resolved, the union, not the
1 The arbitrator may
employee, can take it to arbitration."
sustain the
grievance. He may decide that the employee did not commit the offense
for which he was discharged or he may find that the employee did
commit the offense, but the offense was not so serious as to warrant
discharge and reduce the penalty to a suspension or a warning. In either
case the remedy usually prescribed, or assumed to be prescribed, in the
collective agreement, is not the remedy which would be provided if it
were a suit for breach of a contract of employment. 9 The remedy is
reinstatement, with or without back pay, a remedy not normally
available in court for breach of an employment contract. 20 But the
remedy would be damages if the arbitration were deemed to be merely a
substitute mechanism for adjudication of a suit for breach of contract
between the employer and the employee.' 2'
The consequences of deeming a collective agreement to be
incorporated into individual contracts of employment of the employees
covered by it is contrary to the relationship which the parties to a typical
bargaining agreement intend to create. The question, then, is to what
extent has the law corresponded to that reality. To that I now turn.
Until the enactment of section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, the judicial characterization of the tripartite
relations created by a collective bargaining agreement was a matter of
state law. Section 301 (a) provided for federal jurisdiction over "[s]uits
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce... ,,122 And
in 1957, the Supreme Court decided in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills ofAla., " that "the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a)
is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our
national labor laws."' 24 Before Lincoln Mills, the most extensive federal

116. See id. at 740, 749.
117. See id. at 738.
118. See Feller, GeneralTheory, supra note 109, at 745.
119. See id. at 749-50.
120. See id. at 750.
121. Indeed, that is what the Supreme Court held in Moore v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 630,
632-36 (1941). But Moore was overruled in 1972 by Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,
406 U.S. 320,326 (1972).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994).
123. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).

124. Id.at 456.
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examination of the legal relationships created by a collective agreement
was contained in the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp.2' Westinghouse was a section 301 suit by a union claiming
that the employer had docked the pay of salaried workers contrary to the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement and requesting that the
employees be paid the docked amount.126 The question was whether
section 301 covered such a suit.' 2' The Third Circuit first examined and
rejected in turn the four extant theories as to the nature of the legal
obligations created by a collective agreement: 1) none; 2) a usage to be
embodied in individual hiring contracts; 3) a contract made by the union
as agent for its members; or 4) a third party beneficiary contract.'2 After
examining in detail the types of provisions contained in collective
agreements it then concluded with what it termed an "eclectic" theory.' 9
Insofar as the agreement contained provisions governing relationships
between the employer and the union, such as the union shop or
arbitration, the collective agreement constituted an enforceable contract
between them." With respect to the provisions dealing with the
employer's relationship with employees, such as wages or benefits,
however, the collective agreement was only a promise by the employer
to the union to include such provisions in the individual employees'
contracts of hire.'3 ' Section 301 provided jurisdiction only for suits for
breach of contracts between an employer and a union. While outright
repudiation of the wage provisions of the agreement might be a violation
of the employee-union contract, an erroneous application of those
provisions was a breach only of the assumed individual contracts with
the employers.' That, the Third Circuit concluded, was not within
section 301."4
The Supreme Court affirmed, but there was no opinion of the
Court.' The lead opinion, by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and two others,

125. 210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954), aJfd,348 U.S. 437 (1955) [Westinghouse, 210 F.2d 623].
126. See Westinghouse, 210 F.2d at 624-25.

127. See id. at 625.
128. See id. at 626.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See Westinghouse, 210 F.2d at 626-27.
132. See id. at 624-25, 630.
133. See id. at 627.
134. See id.
135. See Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S.
437,437-38 (1955) [Westinghouse, 348 U.S. 437].
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rejected the Court of Appeals' theory, but held that since state law would
govern the interpretation and enforcement of the agreement between the
union and the employer, there were such constitutional problems that the
Court should conclude that it had no jurisdiction under section 301.136 All
of the other justices, including the dissenters, concurred either expressly
or implicitly in the notion of imputed individual contracts of
employment. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Clark concurred in
the result on the ground that Congress had not intended to authorize a
union to enforce "the uniquely personal right of an employee for whom
it had bargained to receive compensation for services rendered his
employer."'3 7 Afr. Justice Reed disagreed that state law was to be
applied, but concurred in the result on essentially the same ground
asserted by the Court of Appeals.' Justices Douglas and Black
dissented.'39 They too, however, said: "Individual contracts of
employment result from each collective bargaining agreement[,]"' ' but
believed
that the union had standing under section 301 to enforce
41
them.'

The next section 301 case, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills
ofAla. ,' did not directly address the individual contract of employment
question. Lincoln Mills was a suit by a union to enforce the arbitration
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, did not
involve the question of whether the collective agreement should 4be3
deemed to be incorporated into individual contracts of employment.
Westinghouse was, however, ultimately overturned in 1962 by Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n.'44 Smith was a suit by individual employers
claiming that, contrary to the collective bargaining agreement, they were
denied an opportunity to work during a strike by another union. 45 Stating
that the agreement did not contain an arbitration provision, the Court
concluded that an individual suit for breach of the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement could be brought under section 301.' 4 The
decision impliedly rejected the notion that an individual's right to
136. See id. at 459.
137. Id. at 461.

138. See id. at 462-64.
139. See id. at 465.
140.

Westinghouse, 348 U.S. at 466.

141. See id. at 467.
142. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
143. See id. at 449.
144. 371 U.S. 195, 199 (1962).

145. See id. at 195-96.
146. See id. at 199-200.
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receive the benefit of the collective bargaining agreement terms arose
out of an imputed individual contract of employment.47 Section 301
gives jurisdiction to the federal courts only over "[s]uits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization .... , 148 The
question in Smith was whether "between" applied to "suits" or
"contracts,' 49 i.e., whether 301 provided jurisdiction only over suits
between employers and labor organizations or, more broadly, over suits
by anyone for violation of contracts between employers and labor
organizations. The Court said that the latter reading was correct. 150 It
followed that section 301 covered a suit by an individual employee for
violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization.'
Implied in that result was that the source of the individual's right to the
benefits contained in a collective agreement was the collective
bargaining agreement itself,
not any subsumed and implied individual
52
contract of employment.'
The notion that a collective bargaining agreement was incorporated
into individual contracts of employment of those hired under its terms
reappeared briefly, however, in 1966 in Int'l Union, UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp.5 1 That was a suit by a union, not by individual
employees.' m The question was whether it was barred by the statute of
limitations. 5 5 The Court decided that it would not create a federal statute
of limitations, but would adopt the applicable state statute of
limitations. 56 The question then was whether the statute governing
written contracts or oral contacts should apply.' 57 The Court first
acknowledged that "[they had] rejected the view that a suit such as this
is based solely upon the separate hiring contracts, frequently oral,
between the employer and each employee.' ' 58 Nevertheless, it went onto
say that "[i]t does not follow, however, that the separate contracts of
employment [of the individual employees] may not be taken into
account in characterizing the nature of a specific § 301 suit for the

147. See id.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994); see also Smith, 371 U.S. at 198.

149. Smith, 371 U.S. at 200.
150. See id. at 200-01.

151. See id.
152. See id.
153. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).

154. See id. at 698.
155. See id. at 697-98.

156. See id. at 704-05.
157. See id. at 705-06.
158.

UAW, 383 U.S. at 706.
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purpose[s] of selecting the appropriate state limitations provision."'' 9
Therefore, the Court held the state law governing oral contracts of
employment should be the controlling statute even though the suit was
brought by the union complaining of violation of the collective

agreement.WO
Since then the notion that the collective agreement creates an

individual contract of employment incorporating its terms has
disappeared in the Supreme Court. Most significantly, in 1981 the Court
addressed the question of whether an employer could bring suit under

section 301 against individual employees who violated the collective
agreements provision against strikes during the term of the collective
bargaining agreement. 'The strike was unauthorized and, indeed, arose
out of a dispute between the strikers and their union. 6 2 The Court held
that the employees could not be sued for violation of contract.'9 The
assigned reason was section 301 (b).'6" That section provides that a

money judgment against a labor organization should be enforceable only
against the union and should not be enforceable against any individual
member of the union.'6 This was enacted, explicitly, to reverse the result
in the Danbury Hatters case in which individual members were held
liable for the union's actions.' 66 The Court, however, read into the
"penumbra" of section 301 (b) the proposition that individual strikers
were not liable for damages whether or not they were authorized by the
union to strike. 67 The reasoning was specious, as the dissenting opinion
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist amply demonstrated.'6

159. Id.
160. See id. at 707. The holding has since lost almost all significance. Collective agreements
normally provide for arbitration of claims of violation and under Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
379 U.S. 650 (1965), that procedure, with its much shorter time limits, must be utilized. See
Republic, 379 U.S. at 652, 658-59. In individual suits, breach of the duty of fair representation must
be shown, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1967), and the Court has held that the six month
statute of limitation in section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act applies. See Del Costello v.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983).
161. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401,402 (1981).
162. See id. at 403.
163. See id. at 417. The Court had earlier avoided deciding that question in Atkinson v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962). Atkinson was a suit brought against individual union officers for
damages for engaging in an authorized strike during the contract term. See Atkinson, 370 U.S. at
240. The Court held that the individuals were being sued for what was essentially a union breach
and were therefore, not liable. See id. at 246-47.
164. See Complete Auto, 451 U.S. at 415.
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1994).
166. See CompleteAuto, 451 U.S. at 406-07.
167. Id. at 407.
168. See id. at 425-29.
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The result, however, was correct. Reliance on section 301 (b) was
unnecessary. The decision was correct because the collective agreement
is not embodied in individual contracts of employment. The no-strike
provision does constitute a contractual obligation of the union with
respect to strikes during the term. But, with respect to employees, it is
not a contract of employment but a rule of conduct subjecting offenders
to discipline.
Employees covered by a collective agreement may also have
individual contracts of employment, as the Supreme Court recognized in
Caterpillar,Inc. v. Williams.6 9 Indeed, the "articles" that were the source
of Furuseth's objection to the proposed Arbitration Act were just that.
And some collective agreements, particularly in the newspaper and
entertainment industries, expressly envisage such contracts providing
compensation above the collectively imposed minimums. But that is far
different from the proposition that the collective agreement is, in itself, a
contract of employment or is, without more, incorporated in contracts of
employment of those working under it.
V. THE RESULT IS SOUND AND CONSISTENT WITH GILMER' °
We are now in a position to summarize by setting out exactly which
agreements by employees to arbitrate are, or are not, covered by the
Federal Arbitration Act as a result of the exemption in section 1 when
properly construed. Because of the exemption, the Act does not apply to
individual contracts to arbitrate future disputes executed by seamen,
railroad employees or other workers such as those covered by the
National Labor Relations Act that are a condition of employment.
Despite the exemption, the Act does apply to agreements to arbitrate
specific disputes not made as a condition of employment. It applies to
contracts of employment of executives and management employees and
to collective bargaining agreements if an industry affecting commerce is
involved. The Ninth Circuit decision in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co.,"'
was correct in holding that the exemption covered employees in an
industry affecting commerce, but it was wrong in concluding that the
exemption applied: the contract involved was a collective agreement
rather than an individual one.' The Circuit City cases,'73 which relied on
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

482 U.S. 386,395-96 (1987).
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
See discussion supraPart 11, 11.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.
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Craft, involved individual contracts of employment of workers protected
by the National Labor Relations Act and the Court correctly held the
FAA to be inapplicable. 74
Construing the labor exemption as I have argued is not only sound
as a matter of statutory interpretation, but would serve to substantially
ameliorate the undesirable side effects of the Gilmer decision while
leaving its holding intact. It would limit the scope of the FAA largely to
those who are genuinely able to negotiate the terms of their employment
either individually or collectively. The Gilmer holding would be
unaffected. Robert Gilmer was not a "worker," but a Manager of
Financial Services." He was, as the Supreme Court described him, an
"experienced businessman. 1, 76 He was, in short, a management employee
and as such not within the exemption of section 1 of the FAA even
though he was engaged in an industry affecting commerce. If we ignore
for the moment what the Court itself ignored-that if he was to function
as a broker federal law required him to register with the New York Stock
Exchange and the Exchange required him to agree to arbitration, a
situation which no longer exists - he was the kind of employee who
was in a position to refuse to agree to waive his right to judicial
enforcement of his statutory rights. Although he was engaged in an
industry affecting commerce, he was not a "worker" and therefore, not
within the exemption.
But the Gilmer doctrine would be inapplicable to rank and file
workers in most industries who are, in fact, not in Robert Gilmer's
assumed position. The desirable line is between those who have a real
choice as to whether they agree to arbitrate their potential statutory
claims and those who, in practice, do not. Reading the commerce
requirement in the exemption broadly while limiting the exemption to
written contracts of employment of rank and file employees as defined
in the labor statutes does not draw the line with razor-like precision at
the desirable line but comes close. 77 Excluding collective agreements

Ct. 2004 (U.S. May, 2000) (No. 99-1379); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 195 F.3d 1131 (9th
Cir. 1999), petitionfor cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3536 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2000) (No. 99-1378).
174. See discussion supra Part1I,
111.
175. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,23 (1991).
176. Id. at 33.
177. There is one glaring discrepancy: occupations in which the attractiveness of particular
employees to the public plays a major role in determining their compensation. Examples are the
entertainment industry, including baseball and other sports, and newspapers. Collective agreements
in these industries permit, or sometimes require, individual contracts of employment as to which
genuine arm's length bargaining takes place. Defining "workers" as those employees covered by the
labor status would lead to exemption from the FAA of the arbitration provisions in such contracts. If
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from the exemption is also desirable. Given the decision of the Court in
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp.,' arbitration of individual
statutory claims would not be required by virtue of a collective
bargaining agreement unless the agreement clearly and explicitly
authorized arbitration of statutory claims.'79 As I have argued elsewhere,
enforcement of such agreements is, on balance, desirable."
VI. THE EFFECT ON COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
Reading the exemption as not including collective agreements
would have another desirable effect, one wholly unrelated to the rights
of individual employees to enforce their claims. It would make it
possible to apply the FAA to suits to enforce the arbitration provisions
of collective bargaining agreements. The Court in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. ' held that the enforcement of collective
agreements would be governed by federal labor law as a premise for
concluding that the agreement's arbitration provision could be
specifically enforced despite the common law and Alabama's laws to the
contrary.' Reliance on section 301 was essential because the FAA of
itself does not provide federal jurisdiction. But it need not have followed
that the FAA is inapplicable once federal jurisdiction was established
and the Court did not explicitly so hold. 3 The Court simply ignored the
FAA.
The real reason for the Court's reliance on section 301 and labor
policy while ignoring the FAA for the enforcement of the arbitration
provision of a collective bargaining agreement was to provide a basis for
a more generous application of the rules governing arbitrability. At the
time Lincoln Mills was decided, the courts were hostile to arbitration
under the FAA. As the Supreme Court later said there was an "outmoded
that question arises, as it did in Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d
Cir. 1972), perhaps a different and more realistic definition of "workers" should be applied. If not,
one must be content with less than the ideal.

178. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
179. See id. at 79-80.
180. See David E. Feller, CompulsoryArbitration of Statutory Discrimination Claims Under a
Collective BargainingAgreement: The Odd Case of CaesarWright, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.

53, 81 (1998).
181. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
182. See id. at 456-57.
183. The First Circuit, in a companion case decided together with Lincoln Mills, had relied on
the FAA for the enforceability of the arbitration provision. See Local 205, United Elec. Radio &
Mach. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 100-01 (1st Cir. 1956), affd, 353 U.S. 547

(1957).
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presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceedings,"'' 4 as evidenced by
the decision of the Court in Wilko v. Swan.' Lincoln Mills's reliance on
labor law rather than the FAA for the enforcement of arbitration
permitted the Court three years later to derive a presumption of
arbitrability from section 203 (a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act. It said that "the run of arbitration cases, illustrated by Wilko v.
Swan... becomes irrelevant to our problem.... Since arbitration of
labor disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under an
ordinary commercial agreement [i.e. under the FAA], the hostility
evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no
place here."'86
Since those words were written, however, there has been a
complete reversal of the Court's attitude toward FAA arbitration. The
presumption of arbitrability which the Court first announced in a section
301 case has now been applied in almost identical words under the
Federal Arbitration Act.'7 The courts, including the Supreme Court,
have begun to cite labor arbitration cases indistinguishably from
commercial arbitration cases in determining whether arbitration should
be ordered.'88 In determining arbitrability, there is now no difference in
the standard applied under section 301 and that under the Federal
Arbitration Act. 9
That is not, however, the case with respect to the enforcement of
awards once made. The third case in the Steelworkers Trilogy dealt with
the role of the courts in enforcing or vacating a labor arbitration award.' 9
At issue in Enterprise was an award issued after a collective bargaining
agreement had expired and no successor agreement existed.' 9' The award
ordered reinstatement with back pay to employees who had been
discharged during the term of the agreement.' 9 The court of appeals held
that the arbitrator had no authority to award relief beyond the express
termination date of the agreement. 93 There was a certain plausibility to
184. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,481 (1989).
185. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).

186. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)
(citation omitted).
187. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).

188. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,943-45 (1995).
189. See Jonathan R. Nelson, Judge-MadeLaw and the Presumptionof Arbitrability:David L
Threlkeld & Co. v. MetallgesellschaftLtd., 58 BROOK. L. REV. 279,303 (1992).
190. See United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,595-96 (1960).

191. Seeid.at596.
192. See id. at 595.
193. See Enter. Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327,332 (4th Cir. 1959).
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that holding. In the absence of a new agreement the employer had the
right to discharge employees without contractual limitation and there
was no agreement as to rates of pay.'" The Supreme Court nevertheless
reversed.'95 The agreement "could have provided," the Court said, "that
if any of the employees were wrongfully discharged, the remedy would
be reinstatement and back pay up to the date they were returned to
work." ' The agreement did not say that, but the arbitrator, who was not
required to write an opinion, could have interpreted it as so providing
and the question of interpretation of the agreement was a question for the
arbitrator.' 9' "[The courts have no business overruling him because their
interpretation of the contract is different from his[,]" the Court said. 9 '
That holding, it appeared to most, provided the same finality under
section 301 for a labor arbitration award as was provided at common law
for a commercial arbitration award,' 9 and is provided under section 10
of the Federal Arbitration Act.2
Unfortunately the Court in Enterprise Wheel had some preliminary
words to say about the function of a labor arbitrator. The arbitrator, the
Court said, "is confined to interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of
industrial justice.... [H]is award is legitimate only so long as it draws
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement."' ' Those words
provided a loophole which the lower courts were quick to seize upon in
order to vacate awards with which they did not agree. It is possible for a
court to conclude that the arbitrator's reasoning does not comport with
its reading of the agreement and, therefore, does not draw its "essence"
from it, or to say that the arbitrators so misread the contract or the
evidence that they must have been dispensing their "own brand of
industrial justice." As the Sixth Circuit said in 1987:
Where may be a departure from the essence of the agreement if "(1)
an award conflicts with express terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, (2) an award imposes additional requirements that are not
expressly provided in the agreement, (3) an award is without rational
support or cannot be rationally derived from the terms of the
194. Seeid. at331.
195. See United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
196. Id. at 598.

197. See id. 598-99.
198. Id. at 599.
199. See, e.g., Brchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344,349 (1855).

200. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
201. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
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agreement, and (4) an award is based on general considerations of
fairness and equity instead of the precise terms of the agreement. m
Then in 1987, in United PaperworkersInt'l Union v. Misco, Inc.,.2 3
the Supreme Court sought to arrest this trend. While repeating the
"essence" language, the Court made it clear that under section 301 courts
should not second guess the arbitrator. It said: "[A] court should not
'' 4
reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract."
The Court continued: "[A]s long as the arbitrator is even. arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not
suffice to overturn his decision." 20 5
Despite that language, many of the lower courts have persisted in
doing just that if they believe that the arbitrator's reading of the contract
was contrary to the court's view as to its plain meaning. As the Fifth
Circuit said in 1989, "[w]e agree with the company that the rule in this
circuit, and the emerging trend among other courts of appeals, is that
arbitral action contrary to express contractual provisions will not be
respected." The First Circuit has agreed. 2° The Sixth Circuit in 2000
has reiterated its pre-Misco characterization of the grounds on which a
court can find a departure from the essence of the agreement.20 The
Eighth Circuit has said, in direct contradiction to the holding in
Enterprise,"where an arbitrator fails to discuss a probative contract term
and at the same time offers no clear basis for how he construed the
contract to reach his decision without such consideration, there arises a
strong possibility that the award was not based on the contract."2' And
the Ninth Circuit has concluded that where an arbitrator credited the
testimony of a witness that the court believed to be incredible, he must
have been dispensing "his own brand of industrial justice."210
202. Dobbs, Inc. v. Local No. 614, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 813 F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Cement Divisions, Nat'l Gypsuim Co. v. United Steelworkers, 793 F.2d 759, 766 (6th Cir.

1986)).
203.
204.
205.
206.

484 U.S. 29 (1987).
Id. at 38.
Id.
Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Dist. 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F. 2d 599, 604

(5th Cir. 1989).
207. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 864 F.2d 940,

944 (lst Cir. 1988).
208. See Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227, United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 205 F.3d
922,926-28 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 62 (2000).
209. George A. Hormel & Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 9, 879 F.2d. 347,

351 (8th Cir. 1989).
210. Garvey v. Roberts, 163 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2449,2454 (9th Cir. 2000).
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The degree to which the courts will use the express terms to set
aside an arbitrator's award is illustrated by Bruce Hardwood Floors v.
UBC, S. Council of Indus. Workers, Local Union No. 2713.211 The
collective agreement prohibited immediate discharge without prior
22
warning, but an exception was made for specified serious misconduct.
Among those exceptions was "immoral conduct.2 2 3 The grievant was
faced with her electricity being cut off at her home for the entire
weekend unless she paid her bill during working hours.2 4 In order to get
time off to pay the bill, she made up a false excuse to get 45 minutes off,
without pay.215 When the company found out that the excuse was false,
she was discharged although there had been no prior warning.26 The
arbitrator found that the false excuse was not "immoral conduct" so as to
come within the exception and ordered reinstatement.2 7 The Fifth Circuit
set aside the
award on the ground that a lie was, by definition, "immoral
211
conduct.,
It is not that the courts of appeal ignore the doctrine of Enterprise
Wheel, reinforced by Misco. They duly recite it, but then, under one
guise or another, reach conclusions precisely contrary to the doctrine.
Perhaps the most vivid demonstration was the decision of the Seventh
Circuit in Polk Bros., Inc. v. Chicago Truck Drivers.1 9 In that case, the
arbitrator concluded that the employer had violated the contract by
contracting out some driving work and terminating drivers.20 The
arbitrator awarded reinstatement with back pay.22' The decision,
however, was issued after the contract had expired, exactly as in
EnterpriseWheel.22 The Seventh Circuit, after reciting the limited scope
of review under Enterprise Wheel, set aside the order. m It said: "We
hold that the collective bargaining agreements did not allow the
arbitrator to award reinstatement beyond their express termination dates.
Our holding is consistent with the decisions of several other circuits,
which have struck down arbitrator's decisions which were contrary to
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

103 F.3d. 449 (5th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 451 n.1.

Id.
See id. at 453.
See id.
See Bruce Hardwood,103 F.3d at 453-54.

217. See id. at 451,454.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See id. at 452 & n.4.
973 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 595.
See id. at 595-96.
See id. at 596.
See id. at 597-99.
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contractual provisions." Citing decisions of the First, Second, Fifth,
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits,2 it thus reached a result exactly contrary to
Enterprise Wheel after reciting the doctrine of that case.
So long as the qualifying words in Enterprise Wheel as to awards
under section 301 remain, the courts of appeal will utilize them to set
aside awards they strongly feel are wrong. And the plain fact is that the
Supreme Court will not intervene if the courts recite the appropriate
doctrine. Mere error is insufficient to warrant review.
There is a second ground on which labor arbitration awards under
section 301 are attacked. Even where it is clear that an arbitrator is
exercising the authority given him or her to determine that a discharge is
not for just cause, many of the lower courts have set aside awards of
reinstatement on the ground that what the discharged employee did was
contrary to public policy, even though public policy would not have
prevented the employer from voluntarily reinstating the employee.=6 The
Supreme Court has recognized public policy as a ground for vacating an
award if the policy is ascertained by reference to the "'laws and legal
precedents' and not from "'general considerations of supposed public
interests."' ' But it has yet to explain whether the public policy thus
ascertained is to be measured against what the employee did or what the
arbitrator ordered. At least some of the lower courts clearly hold that it is
the former.2"
None of this is true under the Federal Arbitration Act. The courts
are quite explicit in saying that a contention that an award subject to the
FAA is contrary to the language of the agreement is not a ground for
setting it aside. Section 10 of the FAA provides an award to be set aside
only, in reality, if one can show corruption, bias or fraud. 229 That a court
is convinced that an arbitrator's decision is wrong, even plainly wrong,
is not a ground for setting it aside.2' As for vacating on public policy
224. PolkBrothers,973 F.2d at 598-99.

225. See id. at 599.
226. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. workers,
834 F.2d 1424, 1429 (8th Cir. 1987).
227. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (quoting W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Rubber workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
228. See United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 847. F.2d 775, 777-78

(l1th Cir. 1988); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 671, 674 (1lth
Cir. 1988); Iowa Elec., 834 F.2d at 1426-27; contra Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, Int'l, 808 F.2d 76, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Since this article was drafted, the conflict has been
substantially resolved by the Supreme Court in E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers,
121 S. Ct. 462 (Nov. 28, 2000).

229. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
230. See DeltaAir Lines, 861 F.2d at 670.
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grounds, only when arbitrators have found an illegal act have
commercial awards been set aside under the Federal Arbitration Act as
being contrary to public policy.3 As the leading treatise on FAA
arbitration puts it:
[A] number of considerations pertinent to vacation in collective
bargaining arbitration are not pertinent to FAA arbitration. These
include different rules respecting the public policy defense, a greater
inclination of some courts treating collective bargaining awards to find
a 'failure to draw its essence from the contract' or that an award is
against the plain meaning of the collective bargaining agreement. 32
In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court extolled the virtue of labor
arbitration. In United Steel Workers v. Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co., it
said:
Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different functions from
arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility
evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no
place here.... Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by
molding a system of private law for all the problems which may arise
and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord
with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The processing of
disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by
which meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining
agreement.23'
Labor arbitration was thus put on a higher plane than arbitration of
commercial disputes under the FAA. Yet, as a result of the elevation of
FAA arbitration in later years and the misapplication of Enterprise
Wheel, when it comes to enforcement of awards, the reverse is now true.
Labor arbitration is given less respect than commercial arbitration.
Applying the FAA to labor arbitration, which the Court correctly
thought in 1960 would denigrate labor arbitration, would today serve at
least to restore balance between the two. What the Court said in
Enterprise Wheel & Car and Misco should be the rule in reviewing
arbitration awards under a collective bargaining agreement would be
231. See 4 IAN R. MACNEIL Er AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS,
AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT § 40.8.2, at 40:100 (Supp. 1999).
232. Id. § 40.5.1.3, at 40:38-40:39. The authors also state that the two standards from LMRA
cases: "contrary to the plain language of the agreement" and "failure to draw its essence from the
contract[,]" are inapplicable to FAA arbitration. Id. § 40.5.2.6, at 40:51, § 40.6.1, at 40:73.
233. 363 U.S. 574,578,581 (1960).
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reinforced if it were now explicitly held that the FAA is applicable to
collective bargaining agreements. The courts and the commercial
interests that have a stake in the principle of finality would no longer be
able to shrug off as irrelevant to their concerns decisions setting aside
labor arbitration awards. A court would not be able, as the First Circuit
was in Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy,2m to enforce a commercial award and
put aside labor cases, saying that there are differing standards for the
review of labor and commercial awards.23s Furthermore, the FAA
provides a detailed procedural mechanism for the enforcement of
arbitration and the review of arbitration awards which is simply absent
under section 301, as well as provisions for appeal of interim orders
which, as Craftv. Campbell Soup Co. illustrates, are not available if the
FAA is not applicable to collective bargaining agreements. 36
For all of these reasons, the law respecting arbitration under
collective bargaining agreements would be both clear and more effective
if such arbitration was governed by the FAA. That result would be
achieved if the exemption in section 1 should explicitly be held not to
include collective bargaining agreements.
VII. THE ERIE QUESTION
State laws as to the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate such as
those contained in Campbell Soup. 7 and the Circuit City Stores case?"
vary enormously. In a substantial number of states such agreements are
not enforceable. 2 9 If the Ninth Circuit is reversed and the section 1
exemption in the FAA is held to be inapplicable those state laws become
irrelevant except for workers engaged in transportation. The FAA
controls.2 0 But, if the FAA is inapplicable because of the exemption
another question is presented. Are such contracts nevertheless
enforceable in federal courts and what law, federal or state, governs that
234.

914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1990).

235. See id. at 9.
236. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
237. Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
238. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curium), cert.
granted, 120 S.Ct. 2004 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1379); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed,
195 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curium), petitionforcert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3536 (U.S. Feb. 16,

2000) (No. 99-1378).
239. The Brief for the States of California, Arizona, Arkansas, et al. As Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams lists statutory provisions in 12 such
states. In several others enforcement is limited by statute or judicial decision.
240. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681 (1996).
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question?
The common law rule was that an agreement to arbitrate was
revocable at any time before the arbitrator's decision and the agreement
could not be specifically enforced over the objection of the other party.2 1
The FAA was enacted to reverse that doctrine. If the FAA is
inapplicable in the federal courts because of the section 1 exemption,
presumably the common law remains effective. But if the FAA is
inapplicable, does Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkin 2 require that a federal
court apply state law in those states in which agreements such as the
Circuit City Stores' agreement would be enforced? In 1956, the Court in
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 243 held that when the FAA is
44
inapplicable, Erie requires a federal court to follow state law.
Bernhardt was. a suit for damages for breach of an employment
contract.24 Originally brought in a Vermont court, it was removed to
federal court on diversity grounds.m There was no allegation of
interstate commerce. The employment contract contained a provision for
arbitration and the defendant moved for a stay pending arbitration. 247
Vermont adhered to the common law principle that agreements to
arbitrate were revocable.m The district court denied the stay.249 The
Court of Appeals held that section 3 of the FAA covered all arbitration
agreements, without reference to the commerce requirement contained in
sections 1 and 2, and required that the stay be granted.250 The Supreme
Court reversed, finding that the FAA as a whole applied only to
agreements involving interstate commerce5' The Court then went on to
hold that Erie required that state law govern and that the stay should be
denied. 52 What it said in 1956, in concluding that state law governed, is
worth quoting:
The Court of Appeals... followed its earlier decision ... which held
241. See WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS
45 (1930). For the limited exceptions see IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 20
(1992).
242. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
243. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
244. See id. at 202-03.
245. See id. at 199.
246. See id.

247. See id.
248. See Bernhardt,350 U.S. at 199-200.

249. See id. at 200.
250. See id. at 200-01.
251. See id. at 201-02.
252. See id. at 202-03.
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that, 'Arbitration is merely a form of trial, to be adopted in the action
itself, in place of the trial at common law: it is like a reference to a
master, or an 'advisory trial' under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure....' We disagree with that conclusion.... If the federal
court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the
outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit is
brought. For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or
shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of action created by the
State.... Arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on
the law; they need not give their reasons for their results; the record of
their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial
review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial-all
as discussed in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-438.2"
The view of arbitration underlying the Court's decision in
Bernhardthas now been completely reversed. Beginning in 1985, with
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,2 the Court
adopted precisely the proposition that arbitration is "merely a form of
trial," 2 5 and in Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 26
overruled Wilko v. Swan.5 7 Finally, in Gilmer the Court said, referring to
the Mitsubishi Trilogy: "In these cases we recognized that 'by agreeing
to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
to their resolution in an
rights afforded by the statute; it only25submits
8
forum."'
judicial,
a
than
rather
arbitral,
It is, therefore, at least arguable that Bernhardtwent with Wilko and
would not be followed today. But even if it is still good law and would
govern in a suit based on state law, it is clearly distinguishable in a case
like Craft.2 9 The premise of Bernhardt was that the case was based on
diversity. As the Court said before the language quoted above:
We deal here with a right to recover that owes its existence to one of
the States, not to the United States. The federal court enforces the
state-created right by rules of procedure which it has acquired from the
Federal Government and which therefore are not identical with those
of the state courts. Yet, in spite of that difference in procedure, the

253. Bernhardt,350 U.S. at 202-03.
254. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
255. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,433 (1953).

256. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
257. See id. at 480, 484.
258. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,628 (1985)).
259. See generally Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
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federal court enforcing a state-created right in a diversity case is ... in
substance 'only another court of the State.' The federal court therefore
may not 'substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by
the State.'"
Unlike Bernhardt, the Ninth Circuit in Craft v. Campbell Soup
was dealing with a right to recover that owed its existence to the
United States, rather than an individual state. The suit was filed in
federal court and the plaintiff claimed violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 2 The Court did not have to address the state law
question because of the case's posture. The issue was whether a nonfinal order denying enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate was
appealable, clearly a question of federal procedure.263 But if the Ninth
Circuit's position as to the labor exemption in section 1 is sustained, 2"
the question will have to be addressed in other cases and it should be
resolved in favor of federal law if the lawsuit is based on a federal
statute. Although the Supreme Court has held that the jurisdictional
procedures of Title VII (and consequently the ADA and the ADEA), are
not exclusive and that claims of violations of the statutes may be
pursued in the state courts, 5 the rights granted by those statutes are
federal rights, not state rights. It would be preposterous to conclude that
a federal court in which enforcement of a federal right is being sought is
required by Erie to follow the procedures which would apply if the suit
were brought in a state court.
The situation is otherwise in the Circuit City Stores cases and is
directly comparable to Bernhardt.Both of those cases derived from state
court actions claiming violations of California's Fair Employment and
Housing Act." California has a detailed statute providing for the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.267 Implicit in these cases,
therefore, is the question of whether the enforcement of the workers'
Co.,26

260. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202-03 (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09
(1945)).
261. 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
262. See id. at 1084.
263. See id. at 1083.
264. See discussion supraParts II, Ill.
265. See Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821 (1990); see also Krouse
v. Am. Sterilizer Co, 872 F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
266. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam),
cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2004 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1379); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Ahmed, 195 F.3d 1131, 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), petitionfor cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3536
(U.S. Feb. 16,2000) (No. 99-1378).
267. See CAL. Crv. PRoc. §1281 (West 1982 & Supp. 2000).
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agreement to arbitrate should be determined under California law.
Again, however, the question was not decided in the Ninth Circuit
because of the procedural posture of the cases. The cases were
independent actions under section 4 of the FAA seeking stays of the
state court actions.m The district courts granted the stays and, as a result,
the actions remained alive in state court, but stayed pending arbitration
because of the FAA.m The only question before the Ninth Circuit on
appeal was whether section 4 of the FAA applied. 70 In the particular
cases, arbitration would not be required under California law. Circuit
City's arbitration requirement has been held unenforceable as an
unconscionable contract of adhesion. 27' Again, as in the Craft case, the
question of the applicability of state arbitration law is potentially
applicable in other cases which, as in Bernhardt,are removed to federal
court, or, as to state law claims, joined with federal law claims in suits
brought in federal courts.
For the reason already stated, I believe that Bernhardtis outdated
and would be overruled by the Supreme Court. Until it does so,
however, the lower federal courts are obliged to follow it,2 2 unless the
case can be distinguished. It can. If, as I believe it should, the Court
affirms the Ninth Circuit's holding that the workers' contracts
exemption is applicable it can well be argued that state law is preempted
by the FAA. 2 3 In Southland Corp. v. Keating,274 and Doctor's Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto,275 the Court held that the federal policy favoring
arbitration embodied in the FAA required invalidation of state law
limiting the availability of arbitration7 6 Similarly, if the labor exemption
is held to make the FAA inapplicable, it can be argued that there is a
federal policy disfavoring arbitration in cases covered by the exemption
and that state law enforcing arbitration in such cases should not be
effective.

268. See Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071; Ahmed, 195 F.3d at 1132.
269. See Adams, 194 F.3d at 1070-71; Ahmed, 195 F.3d at 1131-32.
270. See Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071;Ahmed, 195 F.3d at 1132.
271. See Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 5 Wages-Hours Cas.2d (BNA) 1360, 1362-64
(Cal. CL App. 1999).
272. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(overruling Wilko v. Swan while at the same time chastising the Court of Appeals for assuming that
the Court would do so).
273. See 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBrrRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS
AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION Acr § 10.8.2.2, at 10:76-10:84 (Supp. 1999).
274. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
275. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
276. See id. at 688; Southland,465 U.S. at 14-16.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The exemption of workers' contracts of employment by the Federal
Arbitration Act, when it is properly interpreted, would confine the
Gilmer decision to those employees for whom it makes sense and, at the
same time, would serve to reinforce the Supreme Court's
pronouncements with regard to arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements. Affirmance of the Ninth Circuit's reading of the commerce
requirement in the exemption would be a first step in that direction.
Reversal of its assumption that a collective bargaining agreement comes
within the exemption, and limiting the class of employees encompassed
in the exemption, would complete the task.
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